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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
ILLINOIS v. TIMOTHY CONDON ____
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS
No. 92-379. Decided February 22, 1993
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.
JUSTICE WHITE, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins, dissenting.
The State of Illinois, petitioner here, seeks review of a judgment of the
Illinois Supreme Court holding that a police search of respondent's home,
conducted pursuant to a warrant, was unconstitutional because the police failed
to knock and announce their presence before entering the premises. Because the
decision below is in conflict with those of other courts on the question of what
showing police must make to dispense with the ordinary knock-and-announce
requirement in executing search warrants, I would grant certiorari.
Based on information provided by informants, police in DuPage County,
Illinois, obtained a warrant to search respondent's home. Police had been told
by the informants that respondent had been using the residence as a base for
cocaine distribution, that residents of the house monitored approaching traffic
with closed-circuit surveillance cameras and a police scanner, and that several
weapons were kept inside the house. The police also knew that the house was
owned by respondent's brother, whom they previously had arrested on drugs and
weapons charges and who was then a fugitive.
On the evening of November 6, 1987, a team of police officers executed the
warrant. They stormed respondent's home without knocking or announcing their
presence and arrested respondent. A search of the home revealed2 ILLINOIS v. CONDON ____
cocaine, marijuana, 13 guns, and marked currency obtained through drug
transactions orchestrated by police earlier that day.
At his subsequent trial, respondent contended that the search was
constitutionally invalid under the Fourth Amendment because police did not knock
and announce their presence before entering his home. The trial court denied
respondent's suppression motion, finding that exigent circumstances justified
the unannounced entry. Respondent was thereafter convicted on several counts.
On appeal, the State Appellate Court reversed respondent's conviction and the
Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the facts did not demonstrate
exigent circumstances sufficient to dispense with the knock-and-announce
requirement. 148 Ill. 2d 96, 592 N. E. 2d 951 (1992). In so holding, the court
turned aside each of the four circumstances proferred by the State as justifying
the unannounced entry: the presence of cocaine in the house and the ease with
which it could be destroyed, the existence of surveillance cameras and a police
scanner, the presence of weapons in the house, and the fact that respondent's
brother had been carrying a loaded pistol at the time of his earlier arrest on
drug charges. Id., at 103-106, 592 N. E. 2d, at 955-956. The court also re- ____
jected the State's contention that these circumstances should be considered
collectively in determining whether the unannounced entry was justified. Id., ____
at 106, 592 N. E. 2d, at 956.
The decision below is in conflict with those of other courts holding that
similar factual showings demonstrate "exigent circumstances" justifying an
unannounced entry. See, e.g., United States v. Keene, 915 F. 2d 1164, _____ _ _____________ ______
1168-1169 (CA8 1990) (fact that narcotics on premises could have been quickly
destroyed justified unannounced entry), cert. denied, 498 U. S. 1102 (1991);
State v. Matos, 135 N. H. 410, ___, 605 A. 2d 223, 224 (1992) (same); State v._____ ______ _____
Williams, 168 Wis. 2d 970, 985-986, 485 N. W. 2d 42, 48 (1992) (combined_________
presence of drugs and guns on premises justified unnanounced entry). The state
courts ILLINOIS v. CONDON 3 ____
are particularly divided over whether the presence of illegal drugs alone will
justify unannounced police entry on the theory that pausing to announce the
search will enable the destruction of evidence. See United States v. Moore, 956 _____________ ______
F. 2d 843, 849-850, and n. 9 (CA8 1992) (acknowledging split of authority and
collecting cases); Matos, supra, at ___, 605 A. 2d, at 224 (same). ______ ______
Although there are perhaps prudential reasons counseling against plenary
review in this case, I would grant certiorari to resolve the conflict.